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Two years, no more: A time limit for criminal case disposition- Would you agree?

Writer: Raymund Narag
Raymund Narag
Aug 13
5 min read

Justice delayed is justice denied. Everyone knows that ancient saying. Everyone repeats it during speeches. Everyone applauds it during conferences. Yet thousands of Persons Deprived of Liberty continue waiting inside overcrowded Philippine jails. Some have waited five years. Others have waited ten years. Still others have waited fifteen or twenty years without conviction. Justice delayed has become justice buried.


These detainees have not been convicted. The Constitution still presumes them innocent. Yet the government has already taken their freedom, livelihood, health, family, and future. They are innocent according to law but punished according to practice. They are presumed innocent outside the jail, but presumed forgotten inside it. What punishment remains after conviction when detention has already consumed twenty years? Ano pa ang natitirang parusa? The process itself has become punishment.


This is not to dismiss the Supreme Court’s efforts. The Court introduced continuous trial rules. It prohibited frivolous postponements and imposed schedules for arraignment, pretrial, trial, and judgment. Many new and younger judges work double time to clear inherited dockets. Some hold hearings continuously, bring work home, and decide cases beyond ordinary working hours. Prosecutors, public attorneys, jail paralegals, and court employees also labor under impossible caseloads. The problem is not simply laziness. The problem is a system where delay survives everyone’s efforts.


Republic Act No. 8493 already provides numerical periods. Rule 119 ordinarily limits the entire trial to 180 days. The Constitution gives lower courts three months to decide cases submitted for judgment. On paper, the machine moves beautifully. On paper, arraignment comes quickly, trial proceeds continuously, and judgment follows promptly. On paper, justice runs like a Japanese train. In reality, it moves like Manila traffic during a flooded payday Friday. Everyone knows the destination, but nobody knows the arrival time.


The rules themselves contain many exclusions. Competency examinations may stop the clock. Interlocutory proceedings may stop the clock. Pretrial motions, judicial inhibition, court transfers, unavailable witnesses, prejudicial questions, other criminal proceedings, and continuances may also stop the clock. Delays attributed to the accused may stop it further. Every exclusion possesses a respectable legal explanation. Every postponement wears a formal barong. Yet after all exclusions are counted, the accused has grown old inside jail.


That is the mystery of Philippine criminal case delay. Nobody intentionally delays the case, but the case remains delayed forever. The judge inherited an overcrowded docket. The prosecutor was reassigned elsewhere. The public attorney received another thousand clients. The witness failed to appear repeatedly. The accused was not transported because the jail lacked vehicles. The stenographic notes remained unfinished. Everyone has an explanation, and nobody has responsibility.


The Supreme Court has said that delay cannot be determined through mere mathematical reckoning. Courts must examine the facts and circumstances surrounding every case. They must consider the complexity of the evidence and determine how much time a competent public officer reasonably needs. That doctrine makes sense for constitutional adjudication. Murder cannot always be handled like shoplifting. A case involving one witness cannot always be compared with a conspiracy involving dozens of accused persons. But flexibility without a final boundary eventually becomes permission.


The Supreme Court has also ruled that accused persons must invoke their speedy-trial rights promptly. Failure to assert those rights may be treated as waiver. That doctrine assumes accused persons understand constitutional litigation. It assumes they know when delay becomes legally unreasonable. It assumes their lawyers visit regularly and file the proper motions. Many indigent detainees know none of these things. They wait because waiting is all they understand. Silence born from ignorance becomes consent manufactured by law.


That must finally end. The right to speedy trial should not depend upon magical words spoken by the accused. It should operate automatically, especially for detained persons. Poverty should not waive constitutional protection. Illiteracy should not excuse institutional delay. Fear of offending the judge should not become consent to imprisonment. A detainee should not need to become a constitutional scholar before receiving constitutional justice. Karapatan iyon, hindi palaisipan.


Congress should therefore enact a Two-Year Criminal Case Disposition Act. Every criminal case should be decided within twenty-four months from the filing of the information until the promulgation of judgment. The period should cover arraignment, pretrial, presentation of evidence, resolution of motions, and preparation of judgment. Silence should never stop the clock. Court congestion, judicial vacancies, prosecutor reassignment, missing transcripts, and unavailable government witnesses should remain the State’s responsibility. Government cannot create dysfunction and use that dysfunction against the accused.


Only narrowly defined delays should be excluded. The clock may stop when the accused deliberately flees, conceals himself, intimidates witnesses, or requests additional time for legitimate defense preparation. Medical incapacity may justify a temporary suspension. War and catastrophic disasters may likewise make court operations impossible. Every exclusion must appear in a written order identifying the exact number of excluded days. No more mysterious calendars should exist. No more years should disappear between resettings.


For detained accused persons, the necessity of continued detention should be reviewed every six months. The prosecution must demonstrate why detention remains necessary. The seriousness of the accusation alone should never be enough. Otherwise, accusation becomes conviction by another name. Courts must consider recognizance, reduced bail, supervised release, reporting requirements, travel restrictions, and restrictions against contacting witnesses. Detention must remain the exception. Liberty cannot depend entirely upon money.


After twenty-four months, the consequence must be unmistakable. The accused must be released immediately. The case must be dismissed automatically with prejudice. No motion should be required because ignorance should never defeat the remedy. No prosecutor’s appeal should delay release. Without a real consequence, the limit will become another decorative rule. We already possess enough decorative rules. They shine brilliantly while detainees rot quietly.


Canada uses presumptive ceilings of eighteen and thirty months. Mexico constitutionally requires trial within four months or one year, depending on the offense. Cambodia and Indonesia impose definite detention periods and require release when lawful authority expires. Brazil requires hearings within thirty, sixty, or ninety days under different procedures. International court-management standards commonly expect most criminal cases to finish within six or twelve months. A Philippine limit of two years is therefore generous. It is hardly revolutionary impatience.


Accountability must accompany the deadline. At eighteen months, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers must explain why the case remains unresolved. Judges must report to the Supreme Court. Prosecutors must report to the Department of Justice. Public attorneys must report to the Public Attorney’s Office. Their explanations must identify every postponement and responsible institution. Failure to provide a reasonable and truthful explanation should invite disciplinary action after due process.


Judicial independence must still be respected. However, Congress may require reporting and define institutional duties. The Supreme Court may discipline judges under its constitutional authority. The Justice Department may discipline prosecutors, while the PAO may discipline public attorneys. Penalties may include reprimand, corrective training, and suspension without pay. Repeated neglect deserves progressively stronger punishment.


Two years should be enough. Two years gives the prosecution ample opportunity to present competent evidence. Two years gives the defense sufficient opportunity to answer the accusation. Two years gives the court reasonable time to examine the facts and write its judgment. If the State cannot prove guilt within two years, the accused should not continue paying for government failure. The Filipino people should not finance endless detention either. Justice needs patience, but injustice has abused patience long enough.


The law must finally draw a line. Before that line, the State receives every reasonable opportunity. Beyond that line, liberty must prevail. Hindi maaaring habang-buhay ang paghihintay. Hindi maaaring habang-buhay ang dahilan. Twenty years without conviction is not justice under difficult circumstances. It is punishment without judgment. Two years should be the limit, and two years should finally mean two years.


Raymund Narag, 6 years, 9 months and 4 days in detention. Eventually, declared innocent by the trial court.

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